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ABSTRACT 
Facial expression processing and the attribution of facial emotions to a context were 
investigated in adults with Down syndrome (DS) in two experiments. Their 
performances were compared with those of a child control group matched for receptive 
vocabulary. The ability to process faces without emotional content was controlled for, 
and no differences appeared between the two groups. Specific impairments were 
found in the DS group according to the task modalities and the type of facial emotional 
expressions. In the emotion matching condition, the DS adults showed overall 
difficulties whereas in the identification and recognition conditions they were 
particularly impaired when processing the neutral expression. In the emotion 
attribution task, they exhibited difficulties with the sad expression only and the analysis 
of their error pattern revealed that they rarely selected this expression throughout the 
task. The sad emotion was the only one that showed a significant relationship with the 
facial expression processing tasks. 
 
1. Introduction 
People with Down syndrome (DS) have traditionally been characterized as friendly and 
very sociable (Carr, 1995; Dykens, Hodapp, & Evans, 1994; Gunn & Cuskelly, 1991). 
However, the recent literature emphasizes emotional and social behavioural problems 
in this population (Coe et al., 1999; Fidler, Most, & Philofsky, 2008; Jahromi, Gulsrud, & 
Kasari, 2008), yet the mechanisms underlying these difficulties remain relatively 
unexplored. The ability to lead successful social interactions can be seen as a complex 
process which relies on an intricate array of interacting cognitive, relational and 
emotional competences (Bach, Happe, Fleminger, & Powell, 2000; Carlson, Moses, & 
Hix, 1998). In particular, the ability to recognize facial emotional expressions and to 
understand the emotional states of others are considered as skills central to develop 
and maintain adequate social relationships. 
Studies investigating emotion processing in DS children generally reported difficulties 
with some specificities regarding the recognition of particular expressions. Some 
studies found impairments for the expressions of anger (Kasari, Freeman, & Hughes, 
2001; Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2007) and surprise (Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000), 
whereas several of them stressed difficulties with the recognition of fear (Kasari et al., 
2001; Porter et al., 2007; Williams, Wishart, Pitcairn, & Willis, 2005; Wishart, Cebula, 
Willis, & Pitcairn, 2007; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000). The error patterns in the emotional 
tasks have been investigated by few authors. Kasari et al. (2001) and Porter et al. (2007) 
reported a tendency to misidentify negative emotions as positive ones, which could not 
be repeated in Williams et al.’s (2005) or Wishart et al.’s (2007) studies. Despite the 
inconsistencies of the results, it emerges that the recognition of negative emotions is 
more problematic for DS children than that of positive ones. In fact, all studies reported 
their relative strength in processing the expression of joy. It is to be noted that the 
above studies concerned children and young adolescents with DS; the adult population 
was surprisingly left out. Yet, a large majority of these studies found that neither 
chronological age (CA) nor developmental age was related to better performances in 
the emotional tasks. In addition, Williams et al. (2005) observed that DS adolescents up 
to 17 years old did not outperform their younger peers, findings which suggested that 
adults and children with DS should present a similar response pattern. 
In a recent study, Hippolyte, Barisnikov, and Van der Linden (2008) investigated facial 
emotion recognition in DS adults (CA = 33.3 years), whose results were compared with 
those of a control group composed of typically developing (TD) children matched for 
receptive vocabulary (EVIP-R, Dunn, Theriault-Whalen, & Dunn, 1993). The capacity to 
process facially expressed emotions was examined through three modalities: 
identification, matching and recognition. The emotion identification and matching 
tasks assessed the expressions of joy, sadness, anger and surprise. The recognition one 
assessed the expressions of joy, sadness and neutral, as well as the intensity attribution 
for joy and sadness. An additional task without emotional content (matching faces 
according to identity criteria) was administered to control for basic face processing 
skills. The main findings reported a specific impairment in the DS participants for the 
surprise expression (identification task) and the neutral expression (recognition task), 
while they did not differ from the control group in the face processing control task. 
Concerning the emotion matching task, Hippolyte et al. also reported that the DS adults 
performed, on the whole, poorer than their controls. Several facial expressions were 
significantly related to the receptive vocabulary measure, and this relation was 
particularly strong with the neutral expression. When rating intensity, the DS adults 
showed a propensity to maximize the items of joy and minimize the items of sadness, 
while the investigation of their error patterns suggested the presence of a positive bias 
in judging facial stimuli. Some similarities appeared between the DS adult group’s 
results and previous findings observed in DS children. Firstly, the DS adults did not 
differ from their control group in the task involving facial stimuli without emotional 
content, results which have also been found in several other studies (Williams et al., 
2005; Wishart et al., 2007; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000). In relation to the facial expression 
tasks, the difficulty to recognize the surprise expression had been observed by Wishart 
and Pitcairn (2000) as well, suggesting that the processing of this emotion did not 
improve with CA. Finally, the positive bias found in the DS adults’ assessment of the 
facial stimuli might be related to the response pattern shown in children by Kasari et al. 
(2001) and Porter et al. (2007). 
The aim of the present study was twofold. In Experiment 1, our objective was to 
replicate Hippolyte et al.’s previous study. No other studies had been published on 
emotion recognition abilities in the DS adult population, and our understanding of this 
issue remains limited. As such, some methodological modifications were introduced in 
their experimental design in order to increase the sensibility of the tasks (the addition 
of trials and distracters). In Experiment 2, the objective was to explore the DS adults’ 
abilities to attribute a facial emotion to a social context. To our knowledge, these 
emotional attribution skills have never been investigated in this population, whereas 
we found only three studies exploring them in DS children. Each of these studies 
proposed a different experimental task. In Turk and Cornish’s study (1998), the 
experimenter presented the participants with four drawings depicting a faceless figure 
in different social contexts (e.g., getting an ice-cream, being chased by a dog) and 
explained what was happening to the figure. Participants were then asked to point to 
the response card (four schematic drawings of the emotions of joy, sadness, anger and 
fear) which best suited the emotion experienced by the figure. For this task the DS 
children obtained a poorer global performance than that of the control group (children 
matched on the EVIP-R vocabulary scale). In Wishart and Pitcairn’s study (2000), 
participants had to choose from three photographs of the same individual portraying 
different emotions (photos taken from Ekman & Friesen, 1976) the photo that 
corresponded to a brief verbal story told by the experimenter (e.g., receiving a present). 
Six items assessing the emotions of joy, surprise, sadness, fear and disgust were 
proposed in this task. The DS children obtained a lower global score than that of their 
control group (children matched on the basis of performance on the Kaufman Facial 
Recognition subtest, Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983), but this difference remained non-
significant. Finally, Kasari et al. (2001) examined emotion attribution abilities through 
a puppet paradigm in which the emotional situations were acted out by a puppet that 
had an expressionless face (e.g., puppet is taken to zoo by mother). The emotions of 
joy, sadness, anger, and fear were assessed (two items per emotion), but Kasari et al. 
did not specify how participants’ responses were gathered. A series of three 
experiments were presented. In the first one, the results of the DS children did not differ 
from those of TD children matched for mental age (Standford-Binet Intelligence Scale, 
Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986). In the second, the DS group performed significantly 
poorer on the items of anger and fear than their two control groups (TD children and 
children with ID of unknown aetiology). The third experiment tracked the progress of 
the DS children who had participated in Experiments 1 and 2 over a 2-year period, but 
no significant improvements were observed in the attribution task. 
The findings of the above studies tend to show that DS children have global difficulties 
in attributing facial emotion according to a context. However, the variety of the 
situations proposed (drawing, story, scenario enacted) makes it difficult to infer a 
reliable response profile from these results. In addition, the limited number of items 
(one or two per emotion) used in these studies restrict the significance of their results 
and impede the possibility to pursue separate analyses per emotion. Finally, we do not 
know if the participants’ abilities to recognize the emotions to be attributed were 
controlled for. This issue might be problematic as these abilities constitute a 
prerequisite to solve the attribution task. Moreover, the children in these studies were 
generally impaired in the other emotion processing tasks they were presented. As these 
studies did not report results from correlation analyses between these two types of 
tasks, we have no information at our disposal about this point. 
The task we proposed in Experiment 2 was specifically created for people with mild to 
moderate intellectual disability (ID). The task instructions were short and simple to 
avoid additional information processing loads, and the responses did not require a 
verbal answer. The emotions of joy, sadness, anger and fear were assessed by means 
of four to five items per emotion. Finally, in our study we examined the relationships 
between the facial expression tasks presented in Experiment 1 and the emotion 
attribution task presented in Experiment 2. In addition, relations between these 
experimental tasks and specific cognitive competences were investigated. The DS 
adults’ results were compared to those of TD children matched on receptive 
vocabulary, a matching measure which is frequently chosen in studies on emotion 
processing in people with ID (Bieberich & Morgan, 2004; Hippolyte et al., 2008; Turk & 
Cornish, 1998). 
2. Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we aimed to further explore the DS adults’ abilities to process facial 
expressions by following Hippolyte et al.’s previous work. We therefore replicated their 
experimental design in order to see if similar results could be obtained. We also wanted 
to further examine the processing of the neutral expressions for which very impaired 
recognition was found in the DS adults group. New items for this expression were 





Twenty-four adults with DS took part in the study (17 men, 7 women), all with a 
moderate ID. All participants had a medical diagnosis of Trisomy 21 and were recruited 
from a sheltered workshop. DS adults with significant sensory, psychiatric or physical 
disabilities, as well as clinical symptoms of dementia were excluded from participation. 
The mean age of this group was 34.3 years (SD = 7.1). The adults were individually 
matched on gender and receptive vocabulary level (raw score) with a control group 
comprised of 24 TD children attending an elementary public school (mean age = 5.9, SD 
= 1.6). The receptive vocabulary task was the French adaptation (EVIP-R, Dunn et al., 
1993) of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981). A Student 
t-test confirmed that no significant differences appeared between the two groups on 
this matching measure, t(46) = -.186, p = .85. 
Two selective attention subtests (Rabbits and Faces) taken from the 
neuropsychological battery Nepsy (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2003) were administered to 
all participants in order to check for its potential influence on the experimental tasks 
(see Table 1). In the first subtest Rabbits, participants were asked to search for target 
pictures (rabbits) among dissimilar distracters (e.g., apple, tree, and dog). The second 
subtest Faces was more complex as two targets (two specific faces) had to be found 
among similar distracters (other faces). The time was limited to 180 s for each subtest, 
and participants were instructed to proceed as quickly as possible. The two groups did 
not significantly differ on the precision score (number of hits minus false alarms) for 
both subtests (Rabbits: p = .061, Faces: p = .092), but the DS adults took significantly 
more time to achieve them (Rabbits: p = .002, Faces: p = .028). The correlations between 
these two subtests were highly significant and the precision score for the Faces subtest 
only was kept so as to not enlarge the subsequent analyses (Rabbit subtest was realized 
near the ceiling by the two groups). Finally a non-verbal reasoning task was 
administered to the DS adults (Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices, CPM, Raven, 
Court, & Raven, 1998). They obtained a mean raw score of 16.08 (SD = 5.27), 
corresponding approximately to an IQ of 60. 
2.1.2. Procedure and materials 
The capacity to process facial expressions was examined through three types of tasks 
(expression identification, expression matching and facial discrimination), while the 
ability to process faces without emotional content was assessed through the identity 
matching test. All stimuli were monochrome photographs of children’s faces, with the 
exception of the facial discrimination task which presented adults’ faces (see Hippolyte 
et al., 2008 for details). These tasks were administered in a counterbalanced order and 
two to four sessions were necessary (25-35 min each) to complete them depending on 
the participants’ fatigue and motivation. These sessions took place over approximately 
one to 2 weeks. All participants were tested individually in a quiet room at their 
workplace or at school. The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Geneva and authorisations from the institution, the legal tutors of the DS 
adults, and the school were obtained. Participants gave their oral consent to take part 
to the study, and were free to withdraw from the procedure at any time. 
 
Table 1 
Participants’ mean results for the receptive vocabulary task (developmental age) and the Nepsy 






Precisiona Time Precisiona Time 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
DS 6;5 (2;8) 17.8 (3) 112.1a (43.6) 4.1 (7.8) 170.7c (20.2) 
Control 6;6 (2;3) 19 (1.3) 75.9b (31.2) 8.2 (8.4) 148.5d (43.4) 
Note: a > b, p < .01; c > d, p < .05. 
a Maximum precision score = 20 for each subtest. 
 
2.1.2.1. Identity matching test. The identity matching test assessed the 
ability to match faces on the basis of their identity, and was used in this experiment as 
a control measure for basic face processing skills. This task, originally taken from the 
battery Face Processing Tests (Bruce et al., 2000), was composed of five subtests of 
increasing difficulty. The subtests 1, New Face-Dis and 2, New Face-Sim constituted 
adapted versions (respectively called Face-Dis and Face-Sim in Bruce et al.’s battery) to 
which a second distracter had been added, whereas the subtests 3-5 had not been 
modified. Each of these five subtests consisted of 16 items and had a similar design: a 
target face was shown at the top of the page and participants had to identify the target 
face (out of three faces for subtests 1 and 2 and out of two faces for subtests 3-5) at the 
bottom of the page. One trial item was offered for the first three subtests to ensure 
comprehension of the task. 
The first two subtests New Face-Dis and New Face-Sim presented complete faces with 
distracters respectively dissimilar and similar (same versus different gender, age and 
general appearance). The subtest 3, Maskedface-Dis, and 4, Maskedface-Sim, 
presented faces that were dissimilar/similar, respectively, with the hair and ears 
concealed. The subtest 5, Eyesmasked-Sim, presented similar faces with hair, ears, and 
eyes concealed. The last three subtests were processed with difficulty by all 
participants in Hippolyte et al.’s study, and rough difficulty in Bruce et al.’s (2000) study, 
which showed that the success rates were not above the level of chance before the age 
of 7 or 8 for the subtests 4 and 5. These last three subtests were assessed in this 
experiment to see if Hippolyte et al.’s previous results could be replicated. 
2.1.2.2. Expression identification and expression matching tasks. The 
expression identification and the expression matching tasks were adapted from two 
tests of the Bruce et al.’s battery (respectively called Emotion-Id and Emotion-Match). 
The number of the distracters had been increased (two instead of one in the original 
version) and a new expression (neutral) had been inserted. For the expression 
identification task which was found easier to execute than the expression matching 
task in Hippolyte et al.’s study, an additional item per facial expression had been added 
to increase the task demand. Both tasks assessed five facial expressions: joy, sadness, 
anger, surprise and neutral. 
In the expression identification task (20 items) participants were shown the stimuli of 
three faces which were placed next to another, and had to point to the face that 
displayed a particular emotion named orally by the experimenter (4 items per 
expression). In the expression matching task (15 items), a target face was shown at the 
top of the page and the participants were asked to point to the face at the bottom (out 
of three) that displayed the same expression as the top one (3 items per expression). 
One trial item was administered in this task. 
2.1.2.3. Facial discrimination task. The facial discrimination task 
(Rojahn, Rabold, & Schneider, 1995) assessed facial expression recognition and 
emotion intensity attribution. It consisted of 41 photographs presenting three 
expressions: happy, sad, and neutral. The participants had to indicate whether a given 
item depicted a happy face, a sad face, or a face that was neither happy nor sad 
(neutral). If the response was happy (or sad), they were asked to decide between two 
intensity levels for that emotion. Level 1 was for a face that was ‘a little’ happy or sad 
and level 2 for a face that was ‘a lot’ happy or sad. Participants had a training session 
with 6 items, before performing a test which consisted of randomly presenting 12 happy 
faces (9 for the first level, 3 for the second), 12 neutral faces and 11 sad faces (7 for the 
first level, 4 for the second). In addition, an emotional bias score reflecting error size 
and trend (overly positive versus negative responses) could be computed for this task. 
This measure was obtained by calculating an error ranking for each response (plus one 
point per degree in the positive trend and minus one point per degree in the negative 
trend). For example a 1- point positive score was assigned when the participant said 
‘very happy’ instead of ‘a little happy’. 
2.2. Results 
The assumption of a normal distribution using one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
was tested for all experimental tasks variables (separately for each group). A normal 
distribution was found for the identity matching test and the facial discrimination task 
allowing us to conduct parametric analyses. Some of the variables of the two facial 
expression tasks expression identification and expression matching did not follow a 
normal distribution, and non-parametric analyses were run for these tasks. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean percentage of correct responses in each of the five identity matching subtests for the 
two groups. 
 
2.2.1. Identity matching test 
The identity matching test data were analysed by means of a 2 (group) x 5 (task) 
repeated- measure ANOVA. Fig. 1 illustrates percentage scores (per group) for the five 
subtests. There was a significant main effect of task, F(4,176) = 91.75, p < .0001, η2 = .675, 
but no effects of group, F(1,44) = .69, p = .41, η2 = .015, nor interaction, F(4,176) = .07, p = 
.58, η2 = .015. Subsequent Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that the first two 
subtests New Face-Dis and New Face-Sim presenting complete faces were equally well 
realized by the two groups, and significantly better than the three subtests Maskedface-
Dis, Maskedface-Sim, and Eyesmasked-Sim. 
2.2.2. Expression identification and expression matching tasks 
Table 2 presents the main results for the expression identification and expression 
matching tasks, as well as the outcomes of the statistical inter-group analysis (Mann-
Whitney U tests). In the expression identification task, the DS group’s performances 
were significantly lower than these of the control group for all expressions, except 
sadness. Intra-group analyses were pursued using Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In the DS 
group, expressions of joy and anger were significantly better recognized than the 
expressions of sadness (ps < .01), surprise (ps < .02), and neutral (ps < .001). Whereas no 
significant differences appeared between the expressions of sadness and surprise, the 
neutral expression was the worst recognized (ps < .01). In the control group, the score 
for the emotion of sadness was significantly poorer than the scores for the emotions of 
joy (p = .005), anger (p = .001) and surprise (p = .037). 
Table 2 
Mean raw scores of the two groups on the expression identification and expression matching tasks. 
Tasks Max. score DS Controls Mann-Whitney 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) U p 
Expression identification       
Joy 4 3.29 (.99) 3.79 (.41) 206 .042 
Sadness 4 2.42 (1.24) 2.88 (1.22) 227 .192 
Anger 4 3.38 (.82) 3.96 (.20) 166.5 .001 
Surprise 4 2.63 (1.34) 3.5 (.93) 180 .015 
Neutral 4 1.63 (.82) 2.92 (1.13) 116 .000 
Expression matching       
Joy 3 1.87 (.75) 2.75 (.44) 105 .000 
Sadness 3 1.43 (1.08) 2.63 (.64) 103 .000 
Anger 3 1.3 (1.10) 2.42 (.71) 122 .001 
Surprise 3 1.35 (.88) 1.75 (.84) 211 .136 
Neutral 3 1.17 (.98) 2.17 (.86) 128 .001 
 
Relating to the expression matching task, Mann-Whitney analyses showed that the DS 
adults obtained significantly lower scores than their controls for all expressions, except 
surprise. The main results for the intra-group analyses revealed that the expression of 
joy was significantly better recognized by the DS participants than neutral (p = .006) and 
surprise (p = .043). No significant differences appeared between the other four 
expressions. In the control group, the expressions of joy and sadness were significantly 
better processed than the expressions of surprise (ps < .001) and neutral (ps < .01). 
2.2.3. Facial discrimination task 
A 2 (group) x 3 (expression) repeated-measure ANOVA was first conducted, taking into 
account the scores (percentages) for the happy, sad and neutral expressions (see Fig. 
2). The analysis revealed that there were significant main effects of group, F(1,46) = 
29.37, p < .0001, η2 = .394 and expression, F(2,90) = 9.64, p < .001, η2 = .197. A significant 
interaction between expression and group, F(2,90) = 12.87, p < .0001, η2 = .211, was also 
observed. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons revealed that the DS adults recognized 
fewer neutral items than their controls, p < .0001. The DS group identified both sad and 
happy expressions (ps < .0001) more easily than the neutral ones, while no significant 
differences appeared between the three expressions for the control group. 
A 2 (group) x 2 (emotion) x 2 (intensity) repeated-measure ANOVA was then performed 
to determine whether groups differed when rating the emotional intensity of the sad 
and happy emotions. The analyses revealed two significant main effects: group, F(1,45) 
= 17.99, p < .001, η2 = .285, and intensity, F(1,45) = 51.11, p < .0001, η2 = .531. There was 
no significant interaction between group and emotion (p = .13), and group and intensity 
(p = .14), but there was a marginal effect of the triple interaction group x emotion x 
intensity, F(1,45) = 3.21, p = .079, η2 = .066. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed that the DS 
group identified the very happy faces significantly better than all the other expressions 
(ps < .05). The faces with very sad expressions were better recognized than ones with 
little happy expressions (p < .001). No differences were found between the recognition 
of little and very sad expressions (p = .254). The control group showed a similar pattern, 
but their results did not differ between the very happy and very sad faces (p = .98), which 
were similarly recognized. 
Finally, we analysed the error pattern of the two groups by carrying out an analogous 
error analysis like the one proposed in Hippolyte et al.’s study. We observed that the 
large majority of the participants rarely selected an emotion in the opposite hedonic 
tone (e.g., happy for sad) when they gave an incorrect answer. We also noticed that the 
DS group tended to propose the emotion of joy more often than the emotion of sadness 
and instead of the neutral expression. Participants with DS obtained an emotional bias 
mean score of 11.95 (SD = 14.5) which was significantly greater than the one obtained 
by their controls (score = 2.29, SD = 4.34) (t = 3.11, p = .003). 
 
2.2.4. Correlations between the three facial expression tasks, CA, and cognitive 
tasks 
A series of correlations were run to investigate the relationships between the three 
facial expression tasks, CA and the cognitive tasks. Significant relations appeared in the 
DS group with all the cognitive tasks (see Table 3), but the most significant among them 
was found with the receptive vocabulary measure, which was related to several 
expressions within the three tasks. More particularly, a strong relation was found in the 
facial discrimination task with the neutral expression (r = .66, p = .001). The non-verbal 
reasoning score and the selective attention measure were related to the expression 
identification and expression matching task to a lesser extent. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mean percentage of correct responses (per expression) in the facial discrimination task for 
the two groups. 
 
In the control group, we observed that CA was strongly related to cognitive measures; 
full and partial correlations were therefore run controlling for CA. The main results 
showed that the expression of sadness was related to CA in the three facial expression 
tasks (Identification: t =.38, p = .018; Matching: t = .49, p = .004; Discrimination: r = .42, p 
= .034). For the expression matching task, CA was also related to surprise (t = .32, p = 
.046) and neutral (t = .42, p = .009). The significant relations observed between the facial 
expression tasks and the EVIP-R score were not preserved after controlling for CA. For 
the selective attention measure, a significant relation remained with the neutral 
expression score in the expression matching task (r = .53, p = .008). 
 
 
Table 3 - Correlations between the expression identification and expression matching tasks (Tau-
B), facial discrimination task (Pearson), chronological age and cognitive measures in the DS 
group. 
*p < .05.   **p < .01. 
 
2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we examined the capacity to process facially expressed emotions 
through three modalities, namely identification, matching and recognition. The ability 







Joy .03 .29 .28 .36* 
Sadness .30 .26 .15 .25 
Anger -.06 .35* .18 .47** 
Surprise .12 .44* .45** .38* 




Joy -.23 .06 .24 .06 
Sadness -.04 .33* .26 .24 
Anger -.23 .06 .22 .16 
Surprise -.33 .38* .24 .32 




Joy .23 .25 .01 .13 
Sadness -.06 -.15 .08 -.03 
Neutral -.15 .66** .21 -.35 
Bias .27 .01 .03 .28 
to process faces without emotional content was controlled for, and no differences 
appeared between the two groups in this task. With regard to the facial expression 
tasks, we noticed important differences in the DS adults’ performances depending on 
the task modality. They were very impaired in the matching condition, whereas they 
exhibited rather specific difficulties in the identification and recognition task according 
to the expressions. 
Corroborating Hippolyte et al.’s previous findings, the DS group processed the neutral 
expression very poorly. In addition, the analysis of their response pattern in the 
recognition task showed a tendency to assess expressions as being more positive than 
they actually were. The correlational analyses stressed that in the DS group a particular 
implication of receptive vocabulary skills was involved in the processing of several 
expressions. The non-verbal reasoning and selective attention abilities were also 
related to certain expressions, often together with the vocabulary score. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
The main objective of Experiment 2 was to explore the DS adults’ ability to attribute a 
facial emotion to a context, since to our knowledge this issue has never been examined 
with this particular population. For this purpose, we used a new task specifically 
created for people with mild to moderate ID. Furthermore, we aimed at investigating 
the relationships between these emotion attribution skills and the emotion processing 
abilities assessed in Experiment 1. We were also interested in the relations between the 




Each of the participants in Experiment 2 had been recruited for Experiment 1. However, 
three of the adults with DS did not participate in Experiment 2. The two groups of 
participants in this experiment consisted thus of 21 adults with DS (15 men, 6 women) 
and 24 TD children (17 boys, 7 girls). The mean age of the DS group was 34.7 years (SD 
= 7.4) and they had a developmental age of 6.6 (SD = 2.7) on the EVIP-R vocabulary 
matching measure. For the Nepsy selective attention subtests, their precision score was 
of 17.62 (SD = 3.18) for the Rabbits (mean response time = 116.05, SD = 42.29) and 4.33 
for the Faces (SD = 7.9) (mean response time = 172.71, SD = 16.62). As with Experiment 
1, the two groups did not significantly differ on the precision score for both Nepsy 
subtests, and the DS adults took significantly more time to achieve them (Rabbits: p = 
.001, Faces: p = .017). The Faces precision score was kept as well for the subsequent 
statistical analyses. Finally, the DS group’s raw score was of 15.9 (SD = 5.44) on the 
Raven CPM task. 
3.1.2. Procedure and materials 
The experimental task presented in Experiment 2 was administered in one session (15-
25 min). All participants had been assessed with the EVIP-R, the Nepsy selective 
attention subtests, and the face processing and facial expression tasks (plus Raven CPM 
for the DS adults) during Experiment 1. 
3.1.2.1. The emotion attribution task. The emotion attribution task 
(Barisnikov, Van der Linden, & Catale, 2004) assessed the ability to infer another’s 
feelings according to a context. Specifically developed for people with mild to 
moderate ID, it consisted of pictorial material which was simple and easy to handle. 
Short and explicit instructions were given in order to reduce additional information 
processing loads, and no oral answers were needed to process the task. 
The task was composed of 22 coloured drawings (13 cm x 18 cm x 3 mm) presented in 
two parts. Part 1 illustrated a young woman (Natacha, 10 items) and part 2 a boy 
(Marco, 12 items) in their daily social interactions. Each situation underlined a 
particular feeling: four items arouse the emotion of joy (e.g., opening Christmas 
presents), five items sadness (e.g., seeing a wounded bird lying on the ground), five 
items anger (e.g., being splashed with water by a car), and five items fear (e.g., 
encountering a threatening dog). In all drawings, the main figure’s feelings were hidden 
as her/his face was missing (hole of approximately 3 cm x 3 cm x 3 mm). For each figure, 
five facial expressions (joy, anger, sadness, fear and neutral) were represented on little 
squares which fitted into the drawings. 
The participant was introduced to the first part of the task by the experimenter, ‘‘I will 
show you some pictures about a girl called Natacha. You will see, many events happen 
to her’’. The instructions were then given, ‘‘The pictures I am going to show you are 
incomplete, Natacha’s face is missing. You will have to add it, each time choosing from 
three faces. You will have to take the face which corresponds best to how Natacha feels 
in this situation’’. The five squares representing the above expressions were then 
presented to the participant one at a time. The experimenter made sure that the 
participant was able to recognize each of the expressions before introducing the first 
situation. The testing began with two learning trial items. The experimenter showed the 
drawing, and gave the instructions, ‘‘Look closely at this picture. From these three 
faces, pick out the one that best shows how Natacha feels in this situation. Once you 
have decided, you can place it here’’. The experimenter pointed at the hole where the 
face was missing. For the first two trial items, the experimenter corrected the answer if 
wrong, and a reflection was made together with the participant to find out the correct 
answer. After the trial items the responses were no longer corrected. This procedure 
was adopted in order to familiarize the participant with the different facial expressions 
and the task. The second part of the task relating to Marco’s items was then presented. 
It followed the same procedure as for Natacha, but there was just one trial item and the 
five faces were proposed each time. Global scores could be calculated (maximum score 





Fig. 3. Mean percentage of correct responses for the four emotions of the emotion attribution task 
for the two groups. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Emotion attribution task 
We first checked for both groups separately to establish if there were significant 
differences between the scores for Natacha’s and Marco’s parts. The differences 
remained non-significant (ps < .05) and subsequent analyses were performed by 
merging the two parts of the task. A 2 (group) x 4 (emotion) repeated-measure ANOVA 
was conducted to determine whether the groups differed on the attribution of the 
expressions of joy, anger, fear and sadness (scores in percentages) (see Fig. 3). The 
analysis revealed main effects of group, F(1,43) = 8.43, p = .006, η2 = .164 and emotion, 
F(3,129)= 12.06, p < .0001, η2 = .219. A significant interaction between emotion and 
group, F(3,129) = 4.86, p = .003, η2 = .101, was also observed.  
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that the two groups only differed for the sad 
emotion, which was poorly attributed by the DS group (p < .001). The DS adults’ score 
for this emotion was significantly lower than the scores for the others expressions (joy: 
p < .001, anger: p = .003, fear: p < .001). In the control group, no significant differences 
appeared between the emotions of joy, sadness and anger, whereas the emotion of fear 
was more poorly attributed than the emotion of joy (p = .009). 
3.2.2. Error analysis 
The confusions committed by the two groups in the emotion attribution task were then 
investigated and Table 4 presents the percentages of responses (correct and incorrect) 
for each emotion that had to be attributed. The DS group’s error pattern revealed 
specificities and not an overall error spread across all expressions. As with the control 
group, the DS adults mainly confused emotions of similar valence (e.g., anger instead 
of sadness). However, this was not the case for the emotion of sadness, which they 
frequently substituted with the emotion of joy. The error rates (percentages) for each 




Emotional expressions given by groups for the emotion attribution task (percentage). 
Responses(%) 
Expected answers 
Joy Anger Fear Sadness 
DS Controls DS Controls DS Controls DS Controls 
Joy 69 83 11 3 11 8 31 12 
Anger 7 3 57 68 16 15 14 12 
Fear 8 4 12 4 61 57 12 6 
Sadness 0 3 9 24 5 12 27 63 
Neutral 15 6 10 1 7 8 15 8 
Note: Bold type indicates correct responses; normal type indicates incorrect responses. 
  
 
Fig. 4. Mean percentage of error rate for the five expressions of the emotion attribution task for the 
two groups. 
 
The DS group showed significantly greater error rates than their controls for the 
expression of joy (p = .03) and fear (p = .018), whereas no differences appeared between 
the two groups for neutral (p = .105) and anger (p = .461) expressions. Of interest, the 
error rate for sadness was larger in the control group (p = .001). Intra-group analyses 
showed that this error rate was smaller than any of the other expressions (ps < .02) in 
the DS group, whereas no other significant differences were observed between joy, fear, 
anger and neutral. 
3.2.3. Correlations between the emotion attribution task, cognitive and 
facial expression processing measures, and CA 
Pearson’s correlations were run within the two groups to investigate the relationships 
between the emotion attribution task (separately per emotion), the cognitive 
measures, the expression tasks (global scores) presented in Experiment 1, and CA (see 
Table 5). The CA was again controlled for in the children’s control group, and partial 
correlations are presented in parentheses in Table 5. 
In the DS group, few significant correlations appeared between the specific cognitive 
competences and the emotion attribution task. The only relations we observed were 
between the selective attention measure and the score for anger and sadness. Neither 
the measures of receptive vocabulary nor nonverbal reasoning were related to the 
various expressions of the Emotion Attribution task in this group. Furthermore, few 
relations were found with the facial expression tasks. The sad expression alone was 
significantly correlated to the expression identification and expression matching tasks. 
In the control group, few relations appeared with the cognitive measures and the 
emotion attribution task; the sad emotion alone was related to both selective attention 
measure and receptive vocabulary. In contrast to the DS group, no significant relations 
appeared with the facial expression tasks assessed in Experiment 1. Finally, we 
observed that CA was only related to the expression of anger. 
Table 5 
Correlations between the emotion attribution task, the expression identification and expression 
matching tasks, cognitive measures and CA in the DS and control groups. 
Variables Emotion attribution task 
Groups Joy Anger Fear Sadness 
CA DS -.02 -.40 -.11 -.40 
 Controls .34 .41* .29 -.003 
EVIP-R DS -.01 .28 .41 .34 
 Controls .38 (.19) .43* (.19) .30 (.11) .30 
Nepsy Faces DS .29 .50* .31 .65** 
 Controls .37 (.24) .26 (.08) .36 (.26) .46* 
Expression DS .17 .31 .13 .47* 
identification Controls .04 (-.12) .40 (.27) .13 (.01) .18 (.19) 
Expression DS .14 .23 .11 .75** 
matching Controls .34 (.16) .26 (-.01) .11 (-.11) .23 (.31) 
Facial DS .25 .13 .16 .29 
discrimination Controls .03 (-.07) -.15 (-.31) .06 (-.03) .30 (.31) 
CPM Raven DS .20 .32 .31 .41 
 Controls / / / / 
Note: Partial correlations controlling for CA in the control group are shown in parentheses. 
* p < .05. 
 ** p < .01. 
  
3.3. Discussion 
In this second experiment, the DS adults were proposed a new task designed to 
investigate their ability to attribute a facial emotional expression according to a 
context. The emotions of joy, sadness, anger, and fear were assessed while the neutral 
expression was used as a distracter. The main results showed that the DS adults only 
differed from their control group in the attribution of the item of sadness, for which they 
obtained poorer performances. Their attribution of this expression was worse than the 
other three, while no significant differences appeared between the expressions of joy, 
anger, and fear. The control group performed similarly for the various expressions, 
except for fear for which the attribution was poorer than that for the expression of joy. 
The analysis of the error pattern showed that all participants rarely selected an 
emotion in the opposite hedonic tone (e.g., joy for anger). However, this was not true in 
the DS group for the sad expression, for which the emotion of joy was preferentially 
substituted. Furthermore, the DS adults rarely proposed this expression throughout the 
task, and the error rate for sadness was smaller than for any other expressions. Finally, 
the correlational analyses showed few significant relations between the emotion 
attribution task and cognitive competences or facial expression processing skills. We 
however observed that the emotion of sadness was related to the selective attention 
measure in both groups, as well as with the expression identification and expression 
matching tasks in the DS group. 
 
4. General discussion 
In this study, we investigated facial expression processing and the ability to attribute 
an emotion to a context in adults with DS through two experiments. In Experiment 1, 
the capacity to process facially expressed emotions was examined following Hippolyte 
et al.’s (2008) previous work. Modifications were introduced to their experimental 
procedure to enhance the task sensitivity by increasing the number of items and 
distracters. In addition, new items were presented for the neutral expression. In 
Experiment 2, the ability to attribute a facial emotional expression to a social context 
was assessed through a new task specifically created for people with ID. The 
relationships between results on these experimental tasks and cognitive measures 
were explored in order to better understand the abilities involved in emotional 
processing. 
In Experiment 1, we first observed that the DS group accomplished the identity 
matching test controlling for basic face processing skills as well as the control group. 
Of interest, the DS participants maintained a good performance in the first two subtests 
(complete faces similar and dissimilar), even though the difficulty level had been 
increased by adding a second distracter to the Bruce et al.’s original version (2000). 
Both groups performed poorly on the last three subtests in which some features (ears, 
hair, eyes) were concealed. These results replicated Hippolyte et al.’s findings and 
corroborated previous research on DS children (Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et al., 
2007; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000). Furthermore, our results strengthen the hypothesis that 
DS individuals can successfully perform facial tasks when no emotional demand is 
introduced. Concerning the facial expression tasks, the DS group generally performed 
well on the identification task, but their results were significantly poorer than those of 
their controls for all expressions except sadness. These results differed from those 
obtained by Hippolyte et al., as the DS group performed the emotion of joy and anger 
as well as their controls in that study. These differences might be explained by the 
increased level of difficulty in the new version of the task (the addition of a second 
distracter), as well as by the control group’s performances which were almost at the 
ceiling for these two emotions. In relation to the neutral expression, intra-group 
analyses showed that the DS participants identified it worse than all the other 
expressions. Theses results strengthen the assumption that DS adults have a particular 
impairment to processing neutral expressions. 
Similarly to Hippolyte et al.’s previous results, the expression matching task in our 
experiment was completed with great difficulty by the DS adults. Yet the analyses 
conducted separately per emotion revealed that the DS participants processed the 
emotion of joy better than the other expressions. The authors suggested that the DS 
group’s failure might be due to a bad comprehension of the task instructions, but we 
found in our study that most of the DS participants did the trial item (emotion of joy) 
well. We may rather relate their poor performances to the cognitive demands of the 
task, for which the level of difficulty was, in our view, higher than the other two 
expression tasks (identification and recognition). To successfully complete it, 
participants first had to define the emotion of the target face and then had to recognize 
it in another face. Considering the DS group’s significant failure in this task, it might be 
more interesting to propose an easier version in subsequent studies. For instance, some 
studies with DS children (e.g., Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et al., 2007) have 
successfully administered a matching task in which the emotion of the target face was 
orally named by the experimenter. This procedure could easily be transferred to our 
task. 
In the facial discrimination task, the results observed in the DS group corroborated 
Hippolyte et al.’s main findings, with a specific difficulty to rate the neutral faces and a 
tendency to assess expressions as being more positive than they actually were. 
Interestingly, the strong relation observed by Hippolyte et al. between the neutral 
expression and the EVIP-R score was replicated as well. These findings sustained the 
assumption that there is a particular link between the ability to recognize the neutral 
expression and the receptive vocabulary level in DS adults. We might thus advance that 
the recognition of the neutral expression in this task is hindered in the DS group by 
difficulties to understand its conceptual representation. However, our experimental 
design did not allow for further investigation of this hypothesis. The meaning and the 
interpretation people with DS attribute to a neutral expression should be explored in 
subsequent research. 
More generally, the correlational analyses pursued between the facial expression tasks 
and the cognitive competences stressed the positive impact of the receptive 
vocabulary in the success of these tasks in the DS group. These results contrasted with 
findings from previous research in DS children (Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et al., 
2007), in which no correlation appeared between language ability and performance in 
the emotional tasks. However, these studies conducted analyses on the task global 
score and not separately per emotion, which might have hidden relations. In our study, 
not all facial expressions were related to the receptive vocabulary measure. 
Regarding the results of the emotion attribution task proposed in Experiment 2, the 
main findings showed that the DS adults only differed from the control group in the 
attribution of the sad emotion, for which they obtained poorer performances. Of 
interest, it was found in Experiment 1 that they generally processed this expression as 
well as their controls, suggesting that there is, in this group, a dissociation between the 
ability to process the emotion of sadness and to attribute it to a social context. The 
analysis of the DS adults’ response pattern stressed a tendency to preferentially 
attribute the emotion of joy for the sad items. Such confusion was also remarked in the 
control group, but to a lesser extent. A part of these errors might be related to an 
observation we made during the assessment. We noticed that several participants did 
not focus their attention on the pertinent element of the drawing raising the emotion. 
For instance a participant might not spot the wounded bird lying on the ground in front 
of Marco (but rather the little flowers on the side), and considered him happy in this 
situation (to be seated in a meadow in flower). This hypothesis may be sustained by the 
significant positive correlations observed between these items and the selective 
attention task in both groups; participants might have particular difficulties to engage 
attentional resources on the negative element of the item. 
In addition, we found positive relations between the score for the items of sadness and 
the expression matching and expression identification tasks in the DS group, showing 
that participants who were better at processing facial expressions obtained a higher 
attribution score for this emotion. We noticed that the DS adults did not only poorly 
perform on the items of sadness, but they also rarely attributed this expression 
throughout the task. This was confirmed by their error rate for sadness which was 
significantly lower than for any other expressions. We might thus suggest that the DS 
group tended to deliberately avoid the attribution of this emotion. Of interest, this 
tendency was specific to the sad emotion and did not apply to the other negative 
emotions. These results contrasted with the error pattern found by Kasari et al. (2001) 
and Porter et al. (2007) in DS children, as they observed that these children tended to 
confuse various negative emotions (anger, fear or sadness) as positive ones. 
Furthermore, the DS group did not show a particular strength in attributing the emotion 
of joy, or a tendency to more frequently propose this emotion through the task. These 
findings also contrasted with results found in Experiment 1, in which the DS adults 
showed strengths in processing this emotion as well as a tendency to assess facial 
expressions as being more positive than they actually were. 
Another interesting result concerns the relatively good performance found in the DS 
group for the fear expression. These findings might be surprising considering the results 
previously reported in the literature; most studies investigating this expression in DS 
children observed particular deficit in its recognition (Kasari et al., 2001; Williams et al., 
2005; Wishart et al., 2007; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000) and attribution (Kasari et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the developmental literature shows that fear is recognized later (around 
6 years) than other basic emotions (e.g., joy, sadness, or anger) (Bullock & Russell, 
1986). In this experiment, we did not find any relation between the success rate for the 
fear expression and specific cognitive competences or emotion processing abilities. 
The DS adults’ performances could be related to their own life experience. This emotion 
is frequently discussed in DS people’s daily life. Caregivers and families regularly warn 
them about situations which might be dangerous (e.g., talking to strangers, compliance 
with others’ demands, etc). To check this assumption, it would be interesting to 
examine other adult populations with ID and see if they also present a stronger 
attribution of this emotion. In addition, in the present study we did not control the 
processing of the facial emotion of fear. This emotion was not assessed in Experiment 
1, which might be stressed as a limitation. It would be important to add this expression 
to the experimental tasks for subsequent studies, and see whether or not DS 
participants showed a dissociation between their abilities to process and attribute the 
fear expression. 
Contrary to our expectations, only a few significant relations were found between the 
emotion attribution task and expression processing skills in both groups, suggesting an 
absence of direct relations between these two aspects of emotional competences. 
These findings might be explained by the greater complexity of the attribution task; if 
the ability to recognize facial emotions to be attributed constitutes a prerequisite to 
solve this task, it involves the ability to infer others’ emotional state. Furthermore, few 
relations appeared between the emotion attribution task and the specific cognitive 
competences, thus corroborating studies in DS children which show no relation 
between their attribution task and mental age (Kasari et al., 2001; Wishart & Pitcairn, 
2000) or verbal age (Turk & Cornish, 1998). Our task design which reduced the 
implication of verbal skills to a maximum, could explain the lack of correlations with 
the receptive vocabulary measure. Moreover, it is also possible that more complex 
language measures (e.g., syntactic comprehension) would show relations. The 
importance of language abilities in the success of tasks related to the theory of mind 
has been stressed in several studies conducted in populations with ID (diverse 
aetiologies) (e.g., Abbeduto, Short- Meyerson, Benson, & Dolish, 2004; Charman & 
Campbell, 2002; Thirion-Marissiaux & Nader-Grosbois, 2008). 
Important variations were observed in the DS group’s results according to the task 
modalities. These findings showed the impact that a particular emotional task might 
have on the participants’ performances and stressed the relevance to assess these 
abilities with several tasks. Despite these result variations, the different tasks proposed 
in this study allowed specificities in the DS adults’ response pattern to be highlighted. 
Corroborating Hippolyte et al.’s findings, our results emphasized a general impairment 
in the processing of the neutral expression, as well as a tendency to overly positively 
judge facial expressions. The implications of this particular facial expression processing 
for other aspects related to the social and relational sphere would be interesting to 
explore in further research. In addition, the causes for the DS adults’ impairment with 
the neutral expressions needs to be further investigated. In relation to the emotion 
attribution task, this new tool seemed to have the correct sensitivity to assess people 
with a moderate ID. Furthermore, it also allowed for a more qualitative approach 
through the possibility of analysing participants’ response pattern. The tendency found 
in the DS group to avoid attribution of the sad emotion constitutes, in our view, a result 
of great interest, providing further information on the DS adults’ emotion processing 
pattern. It would be important to see if further studies replicate this bias. Finally, the 
specificity of the DS adults’ response pattern needs to be confirmed. The results of our 
study showed that the individuals with DS presented particularities in their response 
pattern in comparison to TD children. However, this study does not allow us to 
ascertain that this pattern is specific to DS in relation to other populations presenting 
a genetic disorder associated with ID. It would be important in the future to conduct 
comparative studies in order to investigate this issue. 
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